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ABSTRACT
It is generally agreed that VANET security needs to rely on
entity-centric trust, as well as data-centric methods. Entity-
centric trust typically involves signatures and certificates,
while data-centric methods leverage on consistency checks.
One way to implement data consistency checking is to ex-
ploit redundant information dissemination to detect incon-
sistencies. In this paper, we propose a metric to investigate
the degree of redundancy that different types of informa-
tion dissemination protocols exhibit. We evaluate our met-
ric using simulations of Geocast and aggregation protocols.
Results show that geocast largely eliminates redundancy,
whereas aggregation keeps more redundant communication
paths.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have
received increasing attention from academia and industry
alike. Foreseen applications include safety warnings, traf-
fic efficiency enhancements, and multimedia services. Nu-
merous protocols have been proposed to provide the neces-
sary information dissemination. For some applications, in-
formation about the 1-hop broadcast area around a vehicle
is sufficient. Other applications, especially those for nav-
igation support, need to disseminate information in larger
areas. Schoch et al. [6] propose a categorization of dissemi-
nation protocols, differentiating single-hop beaconing, multi-
hop Geocast, advanced information dissemination, and in-
network aggregation. We focus on the last three categories,
which all disseminate information in a multi-hop fashion in
larger areas.
Copyright is held by the author/owner(s).
VANET’12, June 25, 2012, Low Wood Bay, Lake District, UK.
ACM 978-1-4503-1317-9/12/06.
Security is generally acknowledged as a primary challenge
in VANETs [4, 2]. The original approach to protect vehic-
ular communication is based on entity-centric trust, which
is established by signing packets with ECDSA signatures
and by establishing a public key infrastructure that issues
certificates to vehicles. This approach is currently being
standardized as IEEE 1609.2.
Entity-centric trust ensures that the originators of mes-
sages are actual vehicles or authorized infrastructure. How-
ever, prohibitive cost and complex management of trusted
hardware make it likely that knowledgable attackers will be
able to access key material in vehicles they physically own.
Entity-centric trust does not protect from data alteration
attacks mounted by such insider attackers. Using obtained
key pairs, attackers can either maliciously generate wrong
information or modify information they process as part of
multi-hop dissemination protocols.
Therefore, research papers [5, 3], as well as standardiza-
tion activities (e. g., IEEE 1609.2) propose to complement
entity-centric trust with data-centric methods to check for
consistency. The central idea is to rely on physical models,
local sensors, or data redundancy to detect spurious data.
Various approaches leveraging on physical models and lo-
cal sensors have been investigated. However, these proposals
focus mainly on single-hop applications and corresponding
dissemination protocols.
In this paper, we assess data consistency approaches based
on data redundancy. Our goal is to analyze whether the re-
dundancy present in current protocol proposals can be ex-
ploited to achieve data consistency in multi-hop dissemina-
tion protocols.
2. REDUNDANCY METRICS
We represent the communication network with a directed
graph G = (V,E) where vertices represent vehicles and
edges represent that a vehicle is within 1-hop communica-
tion range of another vehicle. Information that is observed
by a source s ∈ V is forwarded over multiple forwarding
nodes f1, . . . , fm ∈ V to a destination d. To compensate
packet loss, protocols often forward information using mul-
tiple paths from s to d. For the transfer of a single message,
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Figure 1: An example graph showing critical nodes,
namely 2 and 4, on a path between source s and
destination d.
we distinguish two subgraphs of G, namely Gs and G(s,d),
where G ⊇ Gs ⊇ G(s,d).
We use Gs = (Vs, Es) to represent all transfers of a single
message, that is, all forwarding paths starting at s. Hence,
(vi, vj) ∈ Es if, and only if, vi forwards the message, which
vj then receives. Vs contains all vertices in V that are con-
nected to an edge in Es. Further, G(s,d) = (V(s,d), E(s,d))
represents successful transfers from s to d. Thus, V(s,d) and
E(s,d) contain all vertices and edges that are part of a path
from s to d in Gs. Ideally, d receives the message unmod-
ified via all paths. Due to transmission errors, as well as
malicious vehicles, some of the received messages might be
modified.
We assume a single insider attacker a ∈ V \ {s, d} in the
network whose goal is to alter the message that is trans-
ferred from s to d who are both honest. That is, whenever
a receives s’ message for forwarding, a will modify it. We
assume that we cannot distinguish a from normal vehicles
beforehand, because the attacker vehicle creates messages
that conform to the communication protocol and, in gen-
eral, behaves according to the protocol except for modify-
ing message content. Moreover, we assume that d does not
know s’ identity beforehand. Because honest nodes modify
forwarded information in advanced dissemination protocols
such as in-network aggregation, we cannot assume that a can
be detected using entity-centric methods alone. We consider
a to be successful if a is able to modify all copies of the mes-
sage that d receives from s. In order to be successful, a needs
to be in V(s,d) and part of all possible paths from s to d in
G(s,d). A message transfer is called attackable if there exists
at least one a ∈ V(s,d) \ {s, d} such that for all paths p from
s to d in G(s,d), a is on p.
2.1 Node-disjoint paths
We use the number of node-disjoint paths (P) to char-
acterize how resilient a message transfer is against insider
attackers. If a node exists that is part of all paths between
s and d, then G(s,d) becomes disconnected after removing
this node. Thus, the size of the graph’s minimum vertex cut
is one. Applying Menger’s theorems, that means that the
number of node-disjoint paths between s and d in G(s,d) is
equal to 1. We can use maximum flow algorithms to com-
pute the number of node-disjoint paths efficiently. Figure 1
shows an example graph with one node-disjoint path.
If a protocol is not attackable, there are at least two paths
from s to d that have no common nodes apart from s and
d. However, for P = 2, it is still undecidable which node is
the attacker. For P ≥ 3, an attacker can be detected given
an honest majority. However, a straight-forward majority
vote is not possible in all network topologies, because even
a single attacker can control a large share of incoming edges
to the destination d.
2.2 Critical nodes
In case we have P = 1, there is at least one node in the
network that can successfully attack the message transfer
from s to d. However, not all nodes on the node-disjoint
path between s and d can attack successfully. Therefore,
we calculate the critical nodes (C) on the path between s
and d. A node is critical if its removal would disconnect
G(s,d), as shown in Figure 1. In case P ≥ 2, the number
of critical nodes is automatically 0. The more nodes on the
path between s and d are in the set of critical nodes, the more
likely it is that an attacker that is randomly positioned in
the network is successful. Namely, the chance of success is
P (a ∈ V \ {s, d} successful) = C|V \ {s, d}| .
Together, P and C describe the trade-off between commu-
nication efficiency and attack resilience due to redundancy.
3. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
To validate our metrics, we apply them to widely-used
multi-hop data dissemination protocols. We implemented
representatives of the following protocol families.
Baseline. As baseline we use a graph that resembles the
result of a na¨ıve flooding with perfect packet delivery even
over multiple hops. The baseline gives an estimate of the
maximum achievable redundancy.
Geocast. We use an adaptive, probabilistic gossiping
protocol, namely Advanced Adaptive Geocast (AAG) [1]. In
AAG, each node determines the message forwarding proba-
bility based on the current perceived node density according
to 2-hop neighborhood information.
Aggregation. We use a basic aggregation scheme as
representative for in-network aggregation protocols. The
scheme uses fixed size road segments, for which all atomic
observations are averaged. For calculating our metrics, we
assume that a message from the source reaches the destina-
tion if the destination receives an aggregate that the source
message contributed to.
Our simulations are done using JiST/SWANS.1 We con-
sider both city and highway scenarios with changing node
density. For the city scenario simulations, we place all nodes
randomly on a pre-defined road network. For the highway
scenario simulations, nodes are randomly distributed on a
single stretch of road. We do not consider node mobility
at this point, because we focus on single message transfers
between a source and destination and can assume that the
basic network characteristics, e. g., node density, remain the
same during one message transfer.
Figure 2 shows the number of node-disjoint paths in a
city with varying node density. For the baseline, P grows
linearly in the number of nodes, which is expected, because
the graph is more connected with higher node density. For
the aggregation protocol, the number of disjoint paths grows
as well, but at a lower rate. Figure 3 shows that the number
of critical nodes C = 0 for the baseline. For the aggregation
protocol, C also converges to 0 as the node density grows.
The results for AAG in Figure 2 show a much lower number
of node-disjoint paths, which stays constant with growing
1Website: http://jist.ece.cornell.edu/






     	 























  !
 """
#$
Figure 2: Number of node-disjoint paths P for dif-
ferent node densities in a city.
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Figure 3: Number of critical nodes C for different
node densities in a city.
numbers of nodes. This is due to the fact that AAG au-
tomatically reduces redundancy by lowering the forwarding
probability in high node density scenarios. Consequently,
Figure 3 shows a higher number of critical nodes for AAG.
In the highway scenario, we see similar results for all pro-
tocols. However, the aggregation protocol performs almost
equal to the baseline in the highway case. The reason is
that the aggregation protocol needs to disseminate only 10
segments in the highway scenario because the highway only
consists of a single stretch of road.
We observe that for AAG, all metrics are consistent for
both city and highway scenario, as well as for different node
densities. In all settings, AAG performs almost optimal in
terms of communication efficiency. However, the low redun-
dancy due to efficient communication comes at the cost of
possible attacks. Aggregation shows a high level of redun-
dancy for all scenarios. However, aggregation only dissem-
inates summarized information. As a result, the utility of
the disseminated information may be lower. Moreover, the
aggregation protocol’s performance decreases notably in a
city scenario, illustrating the drawbacks of a fixed segments
scheme.
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Data consistency is an important building block for secure
vehicular communication systems. Focusing on entity-based
solutions backed by a public key infrastructure, data con-
sistency measures have been widely neglected by existing
research. We argue that redundant forwarding paths are a
promising technique to enable consistency checks especially
in multi-hop data dissemination protocols.
Previous research on such multi-hop dissemination proto-
cols has focused on aspects like communication efficiency,
therefore aiming to remove any dissemination redundancy.
We complement this research by analyzing how likely it is
for a randomly selected unknown attacker to dominate all
paths from a source to a destination. Our metrics, the num-
ber of node-disjoint paths and the derived number of critical
nodes, are efficient to compute due to their relation to the
well-researched maximum flow problem in graph theory.
We validate our metrics using simulations in different sce-
narios. Our results show that AAG, an efficient Geocast
protocol, reduces communication redundancy to a point that
enables single attackers to fully control the information flow
between a vehicle pair in certain scenarios. We therefore
conclude that current routing protocols will have to be mod-
ified to deal with attacks on data consistency. A simple ag-
gregation protocol shows more promising results in terms
of redundancy. Ideally, future protocols will optimize path
redundancy and bandwidth consumption at the same time.
We are currently extending our metrics to accomplish
more complex attacker models. In addition, we are assess-
ing protocols that use this conflict detection as a baseline to
identify the spurious information in conflict situations.
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